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holds that those who profess liberal values are able to transcend the 
political forces and social conditions which otherwise affect the ac-
tions of men and women and shape the course of history. Profess-
ing realism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism while practicing to a 
considerable degree a doctrinaire formalism, Urofsky's constitu-
tional history illustrates the tensions and contradictions in late 
twentieth-century liberal scholarship. 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLIT-
ICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE. By Wil-
liam E. Nelson.1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
1988. Pp. ix, 253. $25.00. 
Daniel A. Farben 
If this journal gave titles to book reviews, I would have bor-
rowed one from a famous article by Calabresi called Another View 
of the Cathedral. Calabresi was referring to the Monet paintings 
showing the radically different but always entrancing appearance of 
a cathedral at different times. In his most recent book, Professor 
William Nelson offers us a novel view of the Great Cathedral of 
American Constitutional Law, the fourteenth amendment. 
Like Monet, Professor Nelson sometimes paints with broad 
daubs that may obscure details of the cathedral in the interest of the 
larger picture. He rarely troubles to distinguish between the vari-
ous portions of the fourteenth amendment, an omission that some-
times makes for confusion. Yet, like Monet's, Nelson's painting 
reflects long study of the subject. Unlike prior researchers, he has 
gone beyond the pages of the Congressional Globe to engage in ex-
tensive archival research. 
No one perspective can display the entire cathedral. From the 
novel vantage point chosen by Nelson, some of its familiar parts 
drop out of sight. Histories of the fourteenth amendment normally 
focus on its place in Reconstruction. The amendment was inti-
mately linked with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which in turn grew 
out of the thirteenth amendment. Customarily, historians devote 
considerable attention to the debates on those measures in seeking 
to understand the fourteenth amendment. Nelson, having sought 
higher ground in the hills above the cathedral, devotes virtually no 
I. Professor of Law and History at New York University. 
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
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attention to those debates, nor to other Reconstruction measures 
that might shed light on the amendment. Even the old doormat in 
front of the cathedral where the framers wiped their boots, the Dred 
Scott case, disappears from view, without even a listing in the index. 
Some readers may be startled at the disappearance of these familiar 
landmarks, but the choice of any one perspective inevitably sacri-
fices some of what can be seen from other vantages. 
What is Nelson's perspective on the amendment? Essentially, 
he tells the following story about nineteenth century constitutional 
law. In his view, the fourteenth amendment itself was largely an 
exercise in rhetoric rather than lawmaking. The framers "wrote the 
amendment ... to reaffirm the lay public's longstanding rhetorical 
commitment to general principles of equality, individual rights, and 
local self-rule." Today, we can see that these principles are some-
times inconsistent, but the framers hoped that conflicts would rarely 
arise, leaving to later Congresses or courts the task of resolving 
those conflicts. When the courts were faced with the problem of 
translating these vague aspirations into constitutional doctrine, they 
responded along the following lines: 
[Their] premise was that individual rights did not preexist law and were not 
created by federal law; individual civil rights were the creations of state law. The 
federal government could have no power to determine the content of civil rights if it 
was to remain the government of limited power that all Americans wanted. The 
only power that the Fourteenth Amendment granted to Congress and the federal 
courts was power to hold the states to the rule of law: the power to insure that the 
states extended the same rights to all individuals equally except on those occasions 
when the good of the public at large demanded that distinctions between individuals 
be drawn. 
This pragmatic compromise broke down, however, in Lochner, 
when the Court began to view the amendment as embodying rights 
rather than merely a requirement of equal treatment. Although 
Nelson doesn't say so, this presumably means that we ultimately 
have the Lochner Court to thank for the major decisions of the 
Warren Court protecting free speech and the rights of criminal 
defendants. 
Nelson provides a new perspective on the fourteenth amend-
ment and its relationship to the Court's late nineteenth century de-
cisions. He persuasively assembles a considerable body of evidence 
in favor of this viewpoint. There is indeed a large rhetorical compo-
nent to the debates on the fourteenth amendment; the speeches 
often resonate more of the pulpit than the courtroom. Historians 
are now generally agreed with Nelson's view that there was an un-
resolved conflict during Reconstruction between antislavery ideals 
and continuing respect for state prerogatives. This conflict left a 
566 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:431 
major tension for the courts to resolve. As Nelson shows, the late 
nineteenth century cases typically did so more pragmatically than 
Lochner and with greater sensitivity to the public interest in regula-
tion. Thus, Nelson performs a service by showing how cases like 
Munn successfully resolved some of the deep-seated internal strains 
in the views of the framers. 
Nevertheless, while he has highlighted an important theme in 
nineteenth century constitutional thought, Nelson slights other as-
pects of the historical record. In particular, I believe, he overstates 
the "mushiness" of pre-war and Reconstruction republican think-
ing. His handling of the post-war cases may also give some readers 
pause. 
Chapter 2 of the book discusses pre-war ideology. According 
to Nelson, equality was a "vague, perhaps even an empty idea in 
mid-nineteenth century America." While conceding that higher 
law arguments appeared in briefs and judicial opinions, he suggests 
that the idea of higher law was also merely "a form of political rhet-
oric rather than legal analysis." It is clearly true that natural law 
often served rhetorical rather than analytic functions, but it is mis-
leading to suggest natural law was merely a rhetorical embellish-
ment to legal argument. Most notably, the "law of nations" used 
higher law concepts as the basis for a well-developed set of doc-
trines relating to public international law, conflicts law, and com-
mercial law. As every law student knows, this was the era of Swift 
v. Tyson, when the common law was seen (as Holmes said later) as a 
"brooding omnipresence in the sky." 
The law of nations had more than theoretical interest to anti-
slavery republicans. In a series of decisions going back to Lord 
Mansfield, the courts had recognized a "presumption in favor of 
liberty," under which slavery was recognized as an unnatural status 
which could only be created by local legislation. At least until just 
before the civil war, even Southern courts recognized this proposi-
tion. It was also the foundation of the pre-war republican view that 
slavery was lawful in the South but could be banned in the territo-
ries. The pre-war republicans also had more interest in specific in-
dividual rights than Nelson gives them credit for. In particular, 
Southern restrictions on free speech had been an important rallying 
cry for the republicans in the 1850s. True, concepts of higher law 
were often extremely vague, but they had more of a defined core 
than Nelson seems willing to acknowledge. 
As evidence that pre-war references to equality and liberty 
were essentially devoid of cognitive content, Nelson points to the 
fact that equality and liberty were invoked by both anti-slavery and 
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pro-slavery forces, from which he concludes that the concepts 
themselves were empty. All this evidence shows, however, is that 
there was no consensus, not that the contestants lacked clear con-
ceptions of their own. 
Turning to the debates on the amendments, Nelson argues that 
"[i]n many respects the debates ... amounted to little more than a 
rhetorical replay of antebellum antislavery arguments," with some 
"slight but significant" changes. Although the republicans did have 
to come to grips with specific issues to a somewhat greater extent 
during the debates, most of the rhetoric "never went beyond vague 
generalities .... " Thus, as Nelson says in the introductory chapter, 
the "framing generation understood constitutional politics as a rhe-
torical venture designed to persuade people to do good, rather than 
a bureaucratic venture intended to establish precise legal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms." 
I am puzzled by Nelson's description of the framers' concep-
tion of constitutional politics. Whatever may be said of section 1 of 
the amendment, neither the other sections of that amendment nor 
the other civil war amendments look like mere exhortations to "do 
good." The lengthy debates about the precise wording of the fif-
teenth amendment, for example, demonstrate that the framers were 
indeed trying to "establish precise legal rules and enforcement 
mechanisms." Moreover, "constitutional politics" presumably in-
cludes the process of transforming the relationship between the 
Southern states and nation, and much of Reconstruction was bla-
tantly coercive rather than hortatory. As Nelson himself points 
out, the 1866 Congress was willing to jail recalcitrant Southern 
judges who violated civil rights. Were these the legislators who, as 
Nelson says later, wanted to prevent discrimination "without alter-
ing radically the structure of the federal system or increasing mark-
edly the powers of the federal government"? 
While, as Nelson says, republicans did not want to give unlim-
ited power to the federal government, they were ruthlessly willing 
to invade the powers of the states when necessary to achieve their 
goals. The ratification of the fourteenth amendment itself is a com-
pelling example. After the Southern states declined to ratify, their 
governments were reconstituted under military authority. Even 
then, ratification can be considered voluntary only in the most for-
mal sense, because the Southern states had been told that it was the 
price of readmission to Congress. Because of Nelson's failure to 
discuss Reconstruction as a whole, he gives an exaggerated impres-
sion of continuity regarding ideas of federalism during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 
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Although he admits that the historical record is inconclusive, 
Nelson emphasizes the evidence that the amendment guaranteed 
only equal treatment rather than fundamental rights: 
The simplest explanation, which was repeated continually during the congres-
sional and state ratification debates, was that the amendment did not protect spe-
cific fundamental rights or give Congress and the federal courts power to interfere 
with state lawmaking that either created or denied rights. The only effect of the 
amendment was to prevent the states from discriminating arbitrarily between differ-
ent classes of citizens. 
Although there are statements in the debates which support this 
interpretation, it is rather hard to square with some of the language 
of the amendment. "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States" looks like a rights guarantee to me. So does the due process 
clause. By 1866, state due process provisions had been given well-
established procedural meaning (notice and the opportunity to be 
heard, often with a requirement of a jury trial), as well as more 
controversial substantive content. For this reason, the contrast be-
tween "rights" and "equality" was blurred: because the states al-
ready recognized the rights of some citizens, all the amendment 
required was that they treat others equally well. 
In discussing the pre-war and Reconstruction periods, Nelson 
emphasizes the vagueness of the framers' thought and deemphasizes 
their nationalism and belief in fundamental rights. This choice of 
emphasis overplays the similarity between the framers and later 
nineteenth century judges, thereby minimizing the extent to which 
the Supreme Court later betrayed the ideals of Reconstruction. 
Some readers may also be troubled by Nelson's enthusiastic 
embrace of late nineteenth century jurisprudence, whether or not it 
is consistent with the original intent. Even Plessy seems to receive a 
certain degree of approval: "Nineteenth-century courts recognized 
the legitimacy of white parents' claims that they should have some 
autonomy in determining the people with whom their children asso-
ciated in school, and were not prepared to subordinate that claim 
entirely to the interest of blacks in equal educational opportunity 
for their children." He goes on to say that "the Plessy court acted 
in much the same fashion as had the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and that the decision "should not be understood to 
have legitimated the practice [of segregation] except in a context 
where it held out some promise of ultimate racial equality." In 
short, he says (on page 187) that the P/essy Court wisely adopted a 
"balanced posture." 
My own reading of the case does not suggest that Louisiana's 
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power to segregate railroads was conditioned on any future progress 
toward racial equality. Nelson's readings of some other cases are 
also rather different from my own. For example, the issue in Minor 
v. Happersett was whether the fourteenth amendment conferred suf-
frage on women. In the course of holding that it did not, Chief 
Justice Waite remarked that the amendment might have indirectly 
created new voters "because it may have increased the number of 
citizens entitled to suffrage under the constitution and laws of the 
States, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through the States 
and the State laws, and not directly upon the citizen." Nelson puts 
considerable weight on this sentence. To me, it seems to be a 
straightforward reference to the citizenship clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. That clause rather obviously "increased the number of 
citizens" and thereby allowed more people to satisfy at least one of 
the requirements for voting under state law. According to Nelson, 
however, "The sentence makes little sense except by reference to the 
point made frequently in the fourteenth amendment debates: the 
amendment did not create rights but instead left their creation to 
state law; all it did was require the states to give to their least fa-
vored citizens the same rights they gave to those who were most 
favored." 
Nelson's assessment of Lochner is also rather idiosyncratic. If 
the Court had stayed true to the spirit of the framers and to the 
nineteenth century precedents, he says, it would have reached the 
same result but on a different ground, which is that the statute arbi-
trarily singled out bakers for special treatment. As a result of Loch-
ner, however, courts "transformed the Fourteenth Amendment 
from a bar to arbitrary and unequal state action into a charter iden-
tifying fundamental rights and immunizing them from all legislative 
regulation." 
Nelson's assumption, made explicit in the Preface, is that "ju-
dicial protection of equality typically leaves legislatures greater lee-
way in making law than does judicial enforcement of a defined set of 
natural rights." This strikes me as at best a dubious assumption. I 
am hard-pressed to think of any Supreme Court decision involving 
fundamental rights, however activist, that could not have been read-
ily rephrased in terms of equality. Free speech decisions can, as 
Ken Karst demonstrated some years ago, be readily understood as 
conferring equality on those with unpopular views or methods of 
expression. Miranda and similar decisions give the poor and ill-
informed the same rights enjoyed by the rich and knowledgeable. 
Roe is easily seen as protecting women's right to equality. As for 
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economic activism, Lochner itself is the epitome, and Nelson finds it 
readily justifiable under an equality rationale. 
In his final chapter, Nelson describes the late nineteenth cen-
tury Court as "[f]aithful to the compromises that had taken place 
during the framing and ratification of the amendment." The Jus-
tices thereby reduced the amendment to a prohibition on "plainly 
arbitrary" legislation. This appraisal can only be explained by Nel-
son's willingness to dismiss much of the framers' views as merely 
"rhetorical." Because the discussions of specific issues in the four-
teenth amendment debates are rather inconclusive, the Court's later 
actions cannot be said to violate the specific intent of the framers. 
But their broader rhetoric was not merely window-dressing. It re-
flected a passionate belief in equality and individual liberty. It is 
hard to find much passion for either in the later judicial opinions 
which Nelson surveys. If they did not violate the letter of the "orig-
inal intent," they desecrated its spirit. 
As the subtitle of the book suggests, Nelson's true topic is not 
so much the framing of the amendment as its transformation into 
judicial doctrine. Perhaps a more accurate title would have been, 
"The Origins of Late Nineteenth Century Constitutionalism." The 
book illuminates our understanding of some elements of the fram-
ing of the amendment, namely, those that would successfully take 
root in nineteenth century jurisprudence. Less is said about other 
elements, some of which may have more connection with the juris-
prudence of our own day. Such selectivity, however, is probably 
inevitable. Like any great historical event, the passage of the four-
teenth amendment ultimately evades our attempts to capture its 
meaning for all time. 
